Life and the technological: cyborgs, companions and the chthulucene by O'Riordan, Kate
Life and the technological: cyborgs, companions and the 
chthulucene
Article  (Accepted Version)
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk
O'Riordan, Kate (2019) Life and the technological: cyborgs, companions and the chthulucene. 
Auto/Biography Studies, 34 (3). pp. 387-402. ISSN 0898-9575 
This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/74420/
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the 
published  version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to 
consult the publisher’s version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published 
version. 
Copyright and reuse: 
Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.
Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material 
made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available. 
Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third 
parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic 
details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the 
content is not changed in any way. 
Life and the Technological: Cyborgs, Companions and the Chthulucene 
 
Kate O’Riordan  
Professor of Digital Culture  
School of Media Film and Music 
University of Sussex 
Falmer 
Brighton  





Haraway’s cyborg is a widely travelled figure with an important relation to life writing. This 
article traces the cyborg through modes of life writing, and routes through feminist science 
fiction and science studies. It examines attachments and anger, looking at the return of the 
alienated cyborg in recent accounts of Haraway’s work.  
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One of Haraway’s most charismatic and widely travelled figures is that of the cyborg. It 
emerges as a figure in her writing in the 1980s and 1990s and enables important interventions 
in thinking about life and technology. The cyborg is a figure for thinking about lives as 
always, already technological and prosthetic. One of its gifts is that it offers a different way 
into this than either technological evolutionism or the post-humanism of actor network 
theory. The cyborg is a figure of specificity, of fiction but also of real life couplings of 
technology and flesh which are neither evolutionary determined nor neutral, but in Haraway’s 
terms, non-innocent encounters. The non-innocent relationality of the cyborg is posited as 
one of responsibility, which, in Haraway’s lexicon, evokes both an ability to respond to 
others and an ethics of encounter. The cyborg is a singular figure, although in her work 
singularity is always multiple, and allows for thinking about the life of life story and 
technology (e.g. Henwood, Kennedy and Miller).  
 
The figure has generated strong attachments, multiple stories, and anger over the last thirty 
years. This article traces a partial examination of the manifesto as life writing, debates about, 
and practices of cyborg life writing, including autobiography and fiction. It examines the 
possibilities of the cyborg including, anger, rejection and reconfiguration (as embryo and 
doppelganger) as well as its relation to life itself more broadly conceived.  
 
A Manifesto for Cyborgs as life writing: Inhabiting the cyborg. 
 
Haraway and Cary Wolfe describe the style of the cyborg manifesto as less personal and 
autobiographical when contrasted with her later piece, The Companion Species Manifesto. 
However, the cyborg manifesto itself is a form of life writing and Haraway and others deploy 
the cyborg to configure life stories. For example, Haraway writes of inhabiting the figure of 
the cyborg. Early in the manifesto she uses the plural first person we to gather a collective 
identification with the cyborg: ‘The cyborg is a matter of fiction and lived experience (…) in 
short, we are cyborgs’ (Haraway, 1987: 1). She concludes the manifesto in first person voice: 
‘I would rather be a cyborg’. In a much later interview Haraway recalls that she ‘tried to 
inhabit cyborgs critically’ and also writes of leaving the figure behind (Haraway and Wolfe, 
96).  Thus, the cyborg is a singular figure separate from the writer and conjured as a figure 
through the text, but written into a subjective identity both as a singular I and collective we. 
This signals the way in which the singular is multiple for Haraway and this reaches to an 
enduring claim in her work which is that singular identity is always relational in a web or 
dance of life and being. She evokes the integrated circuit and the Spiral Dance as ways of 
articulating the doing of being as relational. In the manifesto she stresses relationality 
throughout. In the forty-two pages of the manifesto, there are thirty-five references to the 
word relation, usually preceded by ‘social’ as in social relations, including the ‘social 
relations of science and technology’ but also relations of domination, wage, sexuality, 
reproduction, gender and machine body relations.  
 
In writing the manifesto Haraway animates the figure of the cyborg, gives it life such that it 
can figure in her writing. The manifesto also gives of Haraway’s life, the life of her voice, 
imagination, politics and disposition but also tracing of her life, and situatedness. There are 
seventy-seven instances of the use of first person terms such as: I, us, our, we; or direct 
references to Haraway’s thinking, influences and collaborations in the writing. This includes 
accounts of her working through ideas at panels, events, discussions, with students, 
colleagues and through reading. There is also a direct autobiographical voice when she 
situates herself within the text:  
“I am conscious of the odd perspective provided by my historical position — a Ph.D. 
in biology for an Irish Catholic girl was made possible by Sputnik's impact on U.S. 
national science-education policy. I have a body and mind as much constructed by the 
post-World War II arms race and cold war as by the women's movements.” (1987: 27-
28)  
The text constantly reiterates her writing voice through the use of ‘I think’, ‘I am’, ‘I know’ 
and ‘I would’. This I also most famously appears in the final line: ‘Though both are bound in 
the spiral dance, I would rather be a cyborg than a goddess.’ (1987: 37).  
 
Haraway refers to the cyborg as a writing technology. ‘Cyborg writing’ appears twice in the 
text but this injunction is the one that has travelled in the proliferation of her figure as it 
traverses other texts: ‘Feminist cyborg stories have the task of recoding communication and 
intelligence to subvert command and control.’ (1987: 30). The word writing appears thirty 
times in the text and operates as a focal operation, at the same time the word life appears 
twenty two times in the text. She links life and writing through the cyborg, as a life writing 
technology most explicitly in this statement: ‘The cyborg is a matter of fiction and lived 
experience that changes what counts as women's experience in the late twentieth century. 
This is a struggle over life and death, but the boundary between science fiction and social 
reality is an optical illusion.’ (1987: 2) The manifesto is situated across life writing genres, on 
one level declaiming and calling for a politics, at others conjuring a figure of ambivalent 
realism, and at others storying Haraway’s position. It draws on autobiography, fiction and 
political theory, negotiating all three genres.  
 
Haraway demotes the cyborg, letting it stand aside because it no longer does the same kind of 
work in later writing and especially in relation to species and companion. It is important to 
think of the adjacency of the figure however. It is not written out, or over, but stands aside, or 
adjacent to the other figures that Haraway works on. It has the sense then of remaining part of 
what she refers to as, ‘a menagerie of figurations’ (Goodeve and Haraway; 135). Haraway 
develops this menagerie over time, in the figurative sense of the word as a diverse or strange 
collection, to think about how to inhabit and account for singularity and multiplicity in a web 
of relations. Even in its emergence in early writing the cyborg was already prefigured and 
prefiguring other relations, including human-machine but also human, machine and non-
human-animal through connections with primatology as well as cybernetics. Her work on 
these figures over time relates to different senses of situatedness and political urgency at 
different moments. Writing in the 1980s in the midst of fracturing political movements 
Haraway offers the cyborg in relation to this question: ‘Which identities are available to 
ground such a potent political myth called 'us', and what could motivate enlistment in this 
collectivity?’ (1987: 9)  
 
The cyborg manifesto then is a form of life writing in that it gives life to the figure of the 
cyborg, situates elements of Haraway’s autobiography and enlists a first person voice. It also 
gives life to the possibility of political affinity and collective political subjectivities. It is 
important to register that it is written against both the technopolitics of the 1980s and a 
perception that there was a feminist rejection of technologies in some versions of eco-
feminism and feminist essentialism. In the final performative desire of the manifesto 
Haraway now famously writes: ‘though both are bound in the Spiral Dance I’d rather be a 
cyborg than a goddess.’ I’ve flagged this statement repeatedly because it is important to think 
about the choreography that Haraway is trying to get at. Again, adjacency is important here, 
the cyborg and goddess are both bound in the doing of life. One does not undo the other, but 
even as multiple, a life is lived in relation to specific positions, although these can be 
contradictory and change. Positions have moments of pertinence, and the cyborg is such a 
moment. In later writing Haraway writes that her demotion of the cyborg risks alienating her 
old doppelganger (2003). This move also of course risks alienating those gathered up through 
this figuration. In a later section I return to the figure of the doppelganger, and examine some 
of the anger and attachment to both the compelling power of the cyborg and to Haraway’s 
letting it stand aside.  
 
Cyborgs and life writing as a field  
 
Haraway’s contribution goes beyond the history of ideas about technology and offers an 
interventional life project. The cyborg is a life writing technology, which, in its first 
instantiation, enables a specific account of the context in which Star Wars, Sputnik, chip 
making and the transition of computers between people and machines are significant. The 
intervention that Haraway made historically in relation to science and technology studies has 
new purchase in relation to resurgent God tricks in materialist and (post)phenomenological 
approaches which have currency right now (e.g. Stiegler; Morton). The figure of the cyborg 
then and Haraway’s sense of life as non-human-human entanglement remain potent 
interventions in the current moment. However, although Haraway is one of the most cited 
scholars in the humanities and the cyborg has travelled through many fields, autobiography 
and life writing scholarship remains curiously ambivalent and amnesiac about its politics.  
 
There are many instances in which the following injunction: ‘Feminist cyborg stories have 
the task of recoding communication and intelligence to subvert command and control’ (1987: 
30) can be examined with a closer lens. In many of these the use of the cyborg as a life 
writing technology comes into focus. Broad indicative examples include Anne Balsamo’s 
work in Technologies of the Gendered Body; First Cyberfeminist International (Solfrank and 
OBN); The Gendered Cyborg: A Reader (Kirkup et al.); Cybersexualities: A Reader on 
Feminist Theory, Cyborgs and Cyberspace (Wolmark); How We Became Posthuman: Virtual 
Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (Hayles); Reload: Rethinking Woman and 
Cyberculture (Flanagan and Booth); The Cyborg Experiments: the extensions of the Body in 
the Media Age (Zylinksa) Moreover, two publications that specifically speak to the field of 
life writing are Nod Miller, Flis Henwood and Helen Kennedy’s edited collection, Cyborg 
Lives? Women’s Technobiographies and Sidonie Smith’s article: ‘The autobiographical 
manifesto: Identities, temporalities, politics’.  
 
Of these two publications, Smith’s was much closer to the cyborg manifesto in terms of 
publication date (1991), with Miller et al publishing a decade on from this (2001). Smith is 
also a much more central figure to the field of life writing than the editors of Cyborg Lives. 
Smith examines three manifestos as autobiography. Hélène Cixous's ‘The Laugh of the 
Medusa’, Gloria Anzaldûa ‘Borderlands/La Frontera’ and Donna Haraway’s ‘A Manifesto 
for Cyborgs’. Smith analyses these texts as forms of feminist autobiography and argues that 
they offer possible revolutionary subjectivities. In bringing these forms of writing into the 
field of autobiography Smith does important work in opening up the political possibility of 
this kind of writing. While her analysis is largely concerned with the political work of re-
writing subjectivity she also identifies the collective we of the manifesto as problematic. She 
indicates that the address to a counter public is also a kind of universalization, albeit more 
narrow and partial than ‘the hegemonic center’s universalization’ (Smith; 209). However, she 
singles out Haraway’s manifesto and its suggestion of an affinity politics as offering a break 
with ‘rigid communitarian identity politics’ (Smith; 209). Thus, for Smith, Haraway’s form 
of autobiographic manifesto becomes a potent political challenge to both the specificity of the 
singular I of biography and autobiography, and to the universal human subject.  
 
It is interesting to note that despite Smith’s intervention, the figure of the cyborg and 
Haraway’s work more generally is not taken up more in the field of life writing. In a 2012 
special issue of Biography on posthumanism, Gillian Whitlock notes that the field of life 
writing has not really engaged with the posthuman. In the collection Haraway’s work is taken 
up, but only in relation to her work on animal-non-human animal relations. Although Smith 
contributes to this collection, her article ‘Reading the posthuman backwards’ doesn’t cite 
either Haraway or her own earlier article about the manifesto. Instead she reads the 
posthuman as figured by the cyborg through a number of other writers including N Katherine 
Hayles and William Mitchell. In the introduction to the special issue, and through the articles 
curated, Haraway’s cyborg is absent both through Smith’s citation practices and Whitlock’s 
critique of the field.  
 
The article in that special collection which most clearly engages with Haraway’s work is 
Cynthia Huff and Joel Haefner’s ‘His Master’s Voice: Animalographies, Life Writing, and 
the Posthuman’. Whitlock observes that despite life writing not engaging with the posthuman, 
the post human is speaking through it now:  
‘Yet the twenty-first century would seem to be a moment when the posthuman is 
speaking, and is speaking through life writing, defined in its broadest sense. (155)  
Huff and Haefner give an expansive definition of life writing as writing which takes a life as 
its subject. At the same time, they seem to mark the limits of posthuman life writing by 
taking non-human animal life as its subject. Life writing as it perceives itself as a field then, 
seems to have had little truck with Haraway’s figure of the cyborg, and in this account of its 
engagement with the posthuman writes out its own history, reflecting an ambivalence in the 
field. The collection also indicates that Haraway’s work on companion species provides an 
identification towards which the field can gravitate and Haraway is cited more often in the 
field without the cyborg.  
 
Another way into thinking about life writing and the figure of the cyborg is to look at Miller, 
Henwood and Kennedy’s Cyborg Lives. Helen Kennedy proposed technobiography to the 
journal Biography as a method in 2003 and both Margaretta Jolly and Wendy Harcourt who 
are active in this field have engaged in kinds of cyborg writing (Jolly; Harcourt). As the 
inclusion of the word in title of the book indicates, Cyborg Lives is an explicit attempt to 
create and examine ‘women’s technobiographies’. In the collection autobiography is used as 
a method to interrogate science and technology studies, and it has had purchase in this latter 
field. Each contribution takes the life of the author, or others, moving across moments of 
biography and autobiography, working with the figure of the cyborg in terms of inhabiting 
the figure as well as contesting it. Discomfort with its associations as well as an exploration 
of its possibility is evident in the collection and in Nod Miller’s conclusion she turns back 
towards the figure of the goddess in direct conversation with Haraway’s turning away. The 
collection helps to illuminate the contradictions and difficulties of cyborg writing as well as 
its capacity for strong attachments. Some of the stories highlight the difficulty of meeting 
Haraway’s injunction to do the work of ‘subverting command and control’.  
 
Flis Henwood’s contribution brings to the fore the powerful mechanisms of technoscientific 
control in relating her struggle with the medicalization of her pregnancy. Her story of her 
own expertise about the age of her fetus is precise, clearly linked to the moment of self-
insemination. However, heteronormative assumptions in biomedicine about pregnancies 
obtained outside of the IVF industry were used to attempt to pressure her into an invasive 
amniocentesis test. Medical expertise defined the age of the fetus, based on the information 
from a scan and was considered more authoritative than her own experience of queer kinship 
practices. In this instance, the age derived from the scan was inaccurate and located the fetus 
in a much higher risk category for Down’s syndrome than was the case based on Henwood’s 
measurement. The cyborg figures here as the writer inhabited a subjective identity in which, 
she, the fetus, a scan, insemination and multiple social relations of science and technology 
coalesced. The figure of the cyborg is powerful in thinking about reproduction, IVF and 
women’s experience in the UK in the 1980s. It also prefigured later developments in IVF 
including its emergence as a global industry in the 80s and 90s, and the introduction of 
practices in human cloning in the early 21st century.  
 
Cyborg embryos and reproduction: writing a technological life itself…… 
 
On the 21st anniversary of the Cyborg Manifesto, Sarah Franklin wrote of the ‘Cyborg 
Embryo’. Her intervention links Cyborg Lives, and particularly Henwood’s contribution, the 
figure of the cyborg and ‘life itself’. In this intervention, Franklin explores the cyborg embryo 
through what she describes as Haraway’s unique grammar of the biological:  
‘Thirty years later Haraway’s analysis speaks cogently to the embryo strewn world of 
the 21st century. The anxious attention so often directed at ‘the’ embryo, as in the 
perennial debate over ‘the moral status of the human embryo’, forgets that human 
embryos are now a vast and diverse population, imaged, imagined and archived in 
media as diverse as liquid nitrogen, DVDs, virtual libraries, t-shirts, logos and brand 
names.’ (168).  
Franklin reconfigures the cyborg embryo to tell the story of how medicalized reproduction, 
and IVF became the interface for stem cells, cloning and transbiology. The figure of the 
cyborg embryo is useful in thinking about how the cyborg is a means of writing about both a 
life, and about life itself. This latter formulation is one that Franklin develops, drawing on 
Canguilhem, Foucault, Duden and Haraway. Life writing techniques have been applied to 
fetuses and embryos to make them the subject of a life. This giving voice to the fetus and 
embryo as a life story has been used predominantly in two different ways. Firstly, to promote 
anti-abortion campaigns by giving a life story to the embryo as a life distinct from the life of 
the mother and secondly to discipline pregnant women into specific modes of conduct viewed 
as best preserving that life (McNeil; Spallone). 
  
Franklin deploys cyborg writing to illustrate the way life itself is storied and embryos are 
technoscientific. Through reframing the embryo she provides an intervention in relation to 
disciplinary embryo biographies. Reframing the cyborg embryo recodes the embryo as life 
enmeshed in technological systems, as technobiographical, acknowledging that life itself is a 
matter of nature-cultures. This challenges the use of the purified representation of the embryo 
to promote a life, which can used against the other lives such an entity is entangled with. It 
reframes the embryo, and the role of IVF to locate them as generative of biomedical 
reproduction but equally of stem cells and cloning. The Cyborg Embryo goes beyond taking a 
life as its subject and extends what it might mean to write about life itself.  
 
The cyborg live: attachments and anger  
 
The cyborg manifesto has helped to open up writing about technological life itself as well as 
technobiographies of lives. The far reaching take up of cyborg writing evidences in part some 
of the strong attachments and affinities the cyborg manifesto generated. I wish to consider 
two further instances of life writing, both of which push the bounds of what life writing 
means. The first is the traversal of the figure of the cyborg across speculative fictions and the 
second is about anger and repudiation, as well as affinity.  
 
Haraway figures the cyborg as a matter of fiction: ‘a creature of social reality as well as a 
creature of fiction’ (1987: 1). Her figuration of this creature drew it away from its 
instantiation in military, command control imaginaries ‘modern war is a cyborg orgy’ (1987: 
2) and towards a challenge to its own genesis. In the Cyborg Manifesto this move is 
articulated as a kind of ironic blasphemy. The cyborg makes many traverses but one that I 
want to pick out is that across Marge Piercy’s He She It or Body of Glass. Piercy’s 
speculative novel unfolds in relation to an expanded definition of life writing: to take a life as 
its subject, and Haraway’s injunction to recode.  
 
Piercy notes in the novel that she was influenced by Haraway’s figure and had read the 
Cyborg Manifesto. Within the story world of the novel many of the characters live cyborg 
lives, clearly enmeshed in systems of control, modification and prosthetics. Two central 
figures are portrayed as cyborgs in different and intensified ways: Yod and Nili. Yod is a 
cyborgian creation, closer to a robot or automata but with significant biological components, 
and is a self-learning AI. His relationship with the more clearly human character Shira, who 
is one of the subjects of life story in the novel, is one way in which the possibility of cyborg 
lives and cyborg subjectivity is explored. Shira is positioned as more human than others in a 
posthuman context of the novel and this is signaled through other characters who consider her 
archaic because she carried her own pregnancy. Shira’s acceptance of Yod as her lover then 
offers an articulation of how cyborg writing might recode both command and control, and life 
itself. Nili passes as more human than Yod, although the house computer recognises her as a 
weapon and Yod as a machine. Nili is extremely enhanced, closer to the militarised cyborg 
fantasy of super warriors, but comes from a radical feminist enclave rather than Yod’s 
patriarchal descent. However, both characters animate the figure of the cyborg in similar 
ways, raising questions about human exceptionality and intervention into the ways in which 
life might be storied.  
 
There are other steps in this choreography of cyborgs however. Haraway notes Piercy’s 
influence on her own work, before Piercy wrote the novel, and before she wrote the 
manifesto. She notes that there is a cyborg-like figure in the earlier novel Women on the Edge 
of Time. She also takes up Piercy’s novel in later work, after the cyborg and thus, these 
traverses connect through reciprocal relations. In a much later piece of life writing, an 
interview in which Haraway reflects on her manifestos, she notes of the early 1980s when she 
was writing the Cyborg Manifesto: ‘I came to read and embrace the anarcha-feminism of 
Marge Piercy. It was a very important period of time for me.’ (Haraway and Wolfe; 204). 
This reflection is of course evidenced in her writing. There are references to Piercy’s earlier 
novel, Women on the Edge of Time throughout various essays and in both Primate Visions, 
and in Simians, Cyborgs and Women. Piercy in turn reads the cyborg manifesto which she 
credits in the endnote of Body of Glass in 1991 as having influenced the novel. This 
choreography of cyborg writing enacts Haraway’s injunction to destabilise fact and fiction 
and taken together provides a way of thinking about life story and the fictional Body of Glass 
in ways that might be more accountable to life. That is to say that Body of Glass writes the 
lives of cyborgs in ways that are in tune with the politics of Haraway’s figure, and invoke 
new reading practices and publics through its address.  
 
The second set of movements around life writing are about anger and attachment. The figure 
of the cyborg has seen passionate attachments, such as between Haraway and Piercy, but has 
also shaped passionate detachments. Through its own engagement with both posthumanism 
and the animal turn, the field of life writing has been more engaged with Haraway’s 
companion species. Other commentators have found it harder to accept animal and other non-
human orientations and have expressed incredulity and anger about what they see as the 
abandonment of the cyborg. However, this misses the way in which the cyborg was 
prefigured and accompanied by companion species in the 1990s.Tracing through the 
conversations between Piercy and Haraway above illustrates the ways in which Primate 
Visions and Simians, Cyborgs and Women figure cyborgs through primate lives. In Primate 
Visions Haraway names the apes Koko and HAM as cyborgs (1989: 138). She goes on to say:  
‘there could be no more iconic cyborg than a telemetrically implanted chimpanzee, 
understudy for ‘man’ launched from earth in the space program, while his conspecific 
in the jungle in a ‘spontaneous gesture of trust’ embraces the hand of a women 
scientist named Jane in an Gulf Oil ad showing ‘man’s place in the ecological 
structure’. (1989: 139)  
Even as it walked from the pages of the manifesto the cyborg was a non-human animal 
relation.  
 
How then to understand the anger and attachments in the writing of Sophie Lewis and to a 
certain extent Jenny Turner this year, around perceptions of Haraway’s animal turn? Both 
writers reviewed Haraway’s latest book in highly invested and negative terms. Sophie Lewis 
writes in an explicitly autobiographic review of Haraway’s Staying with the Trouble: Making 
Kin in the Chthulucene, of one Haraway of the cyborg manifesto who is her hero and whose 
writing felt like coming home, and another Haraway of Staying with the Trouble who makes 
her weep (Turner). Both Lewis and Turner express high praise for the cyborg manifesto, 
before producing extremely negative reviews of Haraway’s later work.  
 
Sophie Lewis writes in an autobiographical mode, portraying her own relation to Haraway’s 
writing over time. In particular, Lewis expresses very strong attachment to the figure of the 
cyborg in terms of how she inhabits her own life story. Lewis writes of a visceral encounter 
with the cyborg manifesto which made of it her:  
‘Ever since she first hacked my teenaged frontal lobes, I have made sense of myself as 
cyborg and stalwartly defended what I recognized in my marrow to be the funny, the 
wild, the profound, the radically illuminating genius of Haraway.’ (Lewis, 
unpaginated).  
Lewis then also inhabits the cyborg, and expresses a visceral charge and change in relation to 
Haraway’s writing. This strong attachment, not just affinity but inhabiting the figure and 
‘coming home’ through Haraway contrast with an account of anger and de-attachment twenty 
years later. Lewis moves from the account of this earlier attachment to one of alienation and 
anger in which she expresses in a language of grief as she charges Haraway with: ‘trafficking 
irresponsibly in racist narratives’ (Lewis, unpaginated). 
 
Jenny Turner’s review of both Manifestly Haraway and Staying with the Trouble takes a 
biographical approach to writing about Haraway, rather than the autobiography of Lewis’s 
piece.  This storying of Haraway’s life is used to situate the books, and also to undermine 
Haraway, who she refers to as alternately smug, old and scatty. As a reader of Turner’s 
version of writing Haraway’s life, it is the misogyny in her repeated allusive shadowing in of 
a figure of an older woman that might be the most problematic. Turner, like others, refers to 
the cyborg manifesto as autobiographical, noting of Haraway that, ‘She sees her first 
manifesto as a sort of intellectual autobiography,’ (5). Turner then goes on to give a particular 
account of Haraway’s domestic life, academic experience and intellectual trajectory. Turner’s 
main issue seems to be that Haraway’s engagement with animals and the reach of nature 
cultures, is not as convincing as her work on cyborgs. After lauding the cyborg manifesto as 
an intervention in thinking about human machine relations, Turner states that: ‘Eighteen 
years after that, Haraway tried something similar with the human-animal parameter in The 
Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People and Significant Otherness.’ Turner appears to 
misrecognize any of Haraway’s previous work on non-human animals and produces a 
reductive, if ‘muscular’ reading of the Cyborg Manifesto. Turner also then draws on Lewis’s 
strong reaction to Staying with the Trouble, for her own critique. There is something of the 
return of the cyborg in both Turner and Lewis’s writing and it is the return of the alienated 
doppelganger.   
In Lewis’ account she charges Haraway with having forgotten her own earlier writing, but it 
is as though Lewis is also writing this out in her repudiation of Haraway’s Chthulucene. 
Lewis, unlike Turner, does not take issue as much with Haraway’s non-human animal 
affinity, so much as with her dealing in compost and soil. However, the central target for 
Lewis is Haraway’s attempt to deal in concerns about population. This triggers Lewis’s 
charge of irresponsible racism. Haraway it seems cannot raise the subject of lives in the 
collective, at the scale of population. Haraway anticipates anger in response to her attempt to 
do so, and this is an almost impossible arena. On the one hand narratives of population 
control are as brutal, colonial, racist and murderous as any of its practices. On the other hand, 
any project of distributive justice that encompasses a more than human polity cannot avoid 
this issue entirely. However, Haraway’s injunction in this context to ‘make kin not babies’, 
can be read in multiple ways. Affinity politics and kin-making was at the heart of the cyborg 
manifesto. Kin-making also relates to queer politics of family in which heteronormative, 
reproductive imperatives and co-option into the priorities of biomedical industries might be 
resisted. To make kin also chimes with another of Haraway’s injunctions; to refrain from 
making killable life.  
 
In When Species Meet Haraway develops the caution against making killable life as a line of 
thought, to try and face up to the responsibility of killing, while trying to do something about 
it. This is also in tune with Haraway’s insistence on non-innocence in her work. Whatever the 
subject of the Haraway’s work, we/it is always of the world and culpable of its conditions not 
separable from it. In opposition to Lewis’s horrified response to Haraway’s attempts to think 
about human death, other readings of When Species Meet critique Haraway for not 
considering the killing of humans. In a collection called Economies of Death, Lopez and 
Gillespie charge Haraway’s consideration of the killing of non-human animals as speciesist: 
‘Thus, there is an inherent speciesism to Haraway’s claims about killing. Namely that 
animals, and especially certain species of animals are more or less sacrificable under 
capitalist regimes of power. We disagree (…) and reject the hegemonic logic of the 
heirarchisation of some species lives and deaths over others.’ (9). Considering species 
vulnerability for humans is too far, considering human killing of non-human animals is not 
far enough.  
 
It is possible to read into these debates an acquisitive desire for Haraway’s writing to provide 
answers and fix everything. However, although her figures have been extra-ordinarily 
powerful and the cyborg did seem, for many, to make an intervention that was close to an 
answer; endings or answers are not the point here. Haraway’s work is an ongoing life writing 
project, extended over decades, it writes of lives and life itself and constructs, reworks and 
spins out numerous figures that have traversed lives, life and writing. The breadth of this 
menagerie of figures and the different steps of this choreography over time are the point. I 
have argued that there are more continuities than contradictions across Haraway’s work, and 
her figuring of cyborgs, companions and Chthulu continue to provoke attachment and anger. 
This capacity for provocation is what is important here and what continues to force thinking 
about profound elements of identity and life itself.  
 
The revenge of the angry cyborg: from cyborgs to companion species 
 
In terms of life writing, Haraway it turns out does not just ‘risk alienating her old 
Doppelganger the cyborg’ but sees it reanimated in a return for vengeance. Lewis invokes the 
visceral intertexual power of the figure of the cyborg and brings it into a project of attacking 
Haraway’s later writing. Lewis’s reanimation then walks off her pages and into Turner’s 
review of Haraway’s later books in which these attacks are intensified. Haraway responded to 
Turner’s borrowed animation of Lewis’s vengeful cyborg in the London Review of Books: 
‘These are strong charges, and should at least be based on passages in my book rather than on 
another writer’s views.’ In responding to Turner’s ventriloquism of the alienated 
doppelganger Haraway draws this form of cyborg writing back into her own life, and opened 
up a correspondence with Lewis and Turner, expanding further what it means to do life 
writing.  
 
Feminist media theorist, Caroline Bassett suggested over a decade ago that the cyborg should 
be buried for a while and dug up later. This prefigures the reanimation of the cyborg as a kind 
of uncanny, angry and vengeful doppelganger by Lewis, and is at the same time in tune with 
Haraway’s later turn to composting, and compositing. In the recent biographical film about 
Haraway, Storytelling For Earthly Survival, Haraway appears as a doubled figure. In two 
scenes she speaks to camera whilst another image of her is on screen in the back ground, 
reading or writing. In another scene she looks at film footage of her younger self explaining 
Primate Visions. Both techniques bring Haraway’s vision of multiplicity of a life, and the 
figure of the doppelganger onscreen.   
 
Haraway gave the cyborg life, animating and inhabiting it in her writing in the 80s and 90s. 
These iterations and the multiple traversals of the cyborg in other people’s writing, cross life 
writing as an academic field but seem to step beyond it until the field’s own rethinking of the 
posthuman in the early 21st century. Both the ambivalence in life writing scholarship and the 
expression of anger in Lewis’s autobiography speak to the multiple attachments the cyborg 
has generated, such that it is hard to think without it.  
 
Franklin’s reworking, taken together with the cyborg lives collection, demonstrates the 
ongoing power of figuration. Together these texts speak to the power of life writing and also 
to techniques of writing life itself. The cyborg embryo emerges as IVF, stem cell research 
and cloning become dominant biological practices. Current practices of genetically 
modifying embryos amplify the cyborg embryo through the emergence of hybrid embryos, 
Mitochondrial transferred embryos and the use of new genetic techniques (such as CRISPR-
Cas9) in both research and reproductive embryos, giving life to new cyborg forms. At the 
same time a resurgent interest in robots and AI characterize sites of cultural production (film 
and TV), and discourses of machine learning, neural networks and companion or service 
robot industries. With increasingly messy edges across the biotechnological spectrum the 
necessary resurrection of the cyborg manifesto as a powerful blasphemy seems ever more 
acute.  
 
Haraway’s play with and animation of other figures, takes readers through women, cyborgs, 
simians, companions and Chthulu. Her writing is part of a project of making weaker stories 
stronger, and stronger stories weaker, and doing so as part of a kin-making network. The 
cyborg embryo, angry cyborgs, alienated doppelgangers and cyborg zombies are part of this. 
Following these figures and their traversing paths enables turns beyond computational 
culture, biotech, and technological fixes. Companions and Chthulu offer routes into and 
thinking about life as machinic, computational, biological, human and beyond human. The 
charismatic force of cyborg writing has been generative of much more than thinking of life as 
cyborgian; it materializes the broader promise of the Cyborg Manifesto and Haraway’s 
menagerie of kinship through thirty years of feminist writing, conversations and thinking 
about life itself.  
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